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TELLING THE TRUTH AND PAYING FOR IT: A 
COMPARISON OF Two CASES-RESTRICTIONS ON 
POLITICAL SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA AND COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
DavidS. Bogen· 
Two cases decided last year appear to provide a stark contrast in 
philosophy toward the basic human right of freedom of speech. In Australia, 
the High Court held that the Commonwealth could punish a citizen who 
encouraged voters to fill out the ballot in a manner that the government 
wished to discourage, even though the method of voting was lawful. 1 In the 
United States, the Supreme Court found that the State could not suppress 
truthful information about a product in an attempt to reduce the demand for 
its sale. 2 In other words, truthful statements encouraging lawful activity 
were protected from a regulation of commercial speech in the United States 
but not from a regulation of political speech in Australia. 
Both countries have constitutional protections for speech. The First 
Amendment secures freedom of speech from abridgment in the United 
States. 3 In Australia, the High Court has implied freedom of political 
discussion from constitutional provisions for representative government. 4 An 
analysis of the two recent cases reveals similarities in the way each court 
approaches the constitutional protection of freedom of speech, but a 
fundamental difference in emphasis with respect to the status of the citizen. 
I. Langer v. Commonwealth 
Australia is the home of the "Australian ballot" -the secret ballot 
which has gained wide acceptance throughout the world. In other respects 
its voting system follows more controversial political theories. Australia has 
instituted compulsory voting and requires the voters to rank all candidates in 
order of preference from the most preferred to the least preferred. 
A. The Compulsory Ballot 
It is a criminal offense for a qualified voter to fail to vote in an election 
* B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Harvard University; LL.M. 1967 New York University 
Law School. Professor of Law and T. Carroll Brown Scholar, University of Maryland School 
of Law. The author wishes to thank George Winterton of the University of New South Wales 
for his helpful notes. 
1. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. 400 (1996). 
2. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4. A.C.T.V. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.L.R. 577 (1992); Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. 
v. Wills, 108 A.L.R. 681 (1992). 
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for Commonwealth office in Australia without a valid and sufficient reason. 5 
Citizens have a duty to participate in government. Compulsory voting 
assures that elected officials are the preference of a majority of the 
electorate, not just a majority of those who choose to vote. 
The Australian system of compulsory voting could not be adopted in 
the United States. It violates the commonly accepted understanding of the 
First Amendment that government may not compel an affirmation of support. 
The United States Supreme Court struck down a compulsory flag salute in 
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 6 saying, "[i]f there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. "7 Compulsory voting appears to force the citizen to speak and act 
in support of political candidates in the election. This contradicts a basic 
premise of United States free speech doctrine. As the Court said in Wooley 
v. Maynard, 8 "the right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and 
the right to refrain from speaking at all. "9 
The American view runs counter to the Australian vision of appropriate 
protections for political choice. Although the Australian Constitution does 
not specifically guarantee freedom of speech, it does provide for voter 
choice. Members of the Commonwealth Parliament must be "directly 
chosen by the people. " 10 Voters must have an opportunity to be informed to 
make that choice. Thus the Australian High Court found an implied freedom 
of political discussion in the Australian Constitution. 11 Even before this 
implied freedom was recognized, Australian citizens used the electoral 
provisions of the Constitution to challenge the compulsory voting laws. 
Ernest Edward Judd, a Socialist Labour party member, contended that 
the Commonwealth could not constitutionally deny him the ability to choose 
not to support any candidate at all. Judd was convicted of violating the 
compulsory voting requirement by failing to vote in a 1925 Commonwealth 
senate election. 12 On appeal to the High Court he argued that the power for 
Parliament "to make laws prescribing the method of choosing senators" 13 did 
5. Commonwealth Electoral Act§ 245 (1918). 
6. 319 u.s. 624,642 (1943). 
7. /d. 
8. 430 u.s. 705 (1977). 
9. /d. at 714. 
10. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 7 (senators), 24 (members ofthe House). 
11. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, 108 A.L.R. 681 (1992); A.C.T.V. v. 
Commonwealth, 108 A.L.R. 577, 596-97 (1992). 
12. At that time the requirement was found in Section 128A of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act of 1918-1925. 
13. AUSTL. CONST. § 9. The provisions for election to the House of Representatives 
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not extend to compulsory voting. Noting that his party did not participate in 
the federal election because of the costs to get its candidates on the ballot, 
Judd complained that all the candidates on the ballot supported capitalism. 
It would betray his principles and those of his party to vote for any of them. 
Forcing him to vote, he said, denied him his choice. 
In Judd v. McKeon, 14 the Australian High Court upheld the compulsory 
voting law. As long as choice exists, a voter's dislike of the choices or how 
they are to be made does not matter. The joint opinion of three justices 
interpreted "choosing" to refer to a selection between available options. The 
requirement of a choice would be satisfied even if all the alternatives were 
undesirable. 15 Two other justices agreed. One of them, Justice Isaac Isaacs 
said, "[t]he compulsory performance of a public duty is entirely consistent 
with freedom of action in the course of performing it." 16 Justice Isaacs noted 
that the compulsory system would be undermined if dislike of the candidates 
served as an excuse for not going to the polls. 17 
The compulsory ballot does not prevent Australians like Judd from 
arguing against the system of compulsory voting or stating that all the 
candidates are abominable. The requirement prevents elections from going 
by default to the candidate with the most intense supporters (i.e., those 
motivated to come to the polls) rather than with the most supporters. It 
makes the vote not just a right, but also a duty which the citizen owes to the 
Commonwealth. As in the case of the military draft, the law exempts 
religious conscientious objectors, but not persons simply opposed to the 
current political situation. 
Only Justice Henry Bournes Higgins dissented from the decision in 
Judd. He did not question the constitutional power of Parliament to require 
compulsory voting, but reasoned that scruples of opposition were a "valid 
and sufficient reason" under the provisions of the statute for refusing to 
vote. 18 
B. The Voting Preference System 
Australian elections use a preference system of voting in which the 
voter casts a vote for all the candidates in order of preference. With respect 
to Commonwealth elections, Section 240 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
of 1918 provides: 
do not specifically refer to choice. /d.§§ 31, 5l(xxxvi) (members of the House). 
14. 38 C.L.R. 380 (1926). 
15. /d. at 383 (Knox, C.J., Gavan Duffy & Starke, JJ.). 
16. /d. at 385 (Isaacs, J.). 
17. /d. at 386 (Isaacs, J.). 
18. /d. at 387-89 (Higgins, J .). 
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In a House of Representatives election a person shall mark 
his or her vote on the ballot-paper by: 
(a) writing the number 1 in the square opposite the name 
of the candidate for whom the person votes as his or 
her first preference, 
(b) writing the numbers 2, 3, 4 (and so on, as the case 
requires) in the squares opposite the names of all the 
remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of 
the person's preference for them. 19 
[Vol. 7:1 
The underlying rationale for this method of voting is to assure that the 
winning candidate is the preference of the majority of the voters. That does 
not always happen where voters vote for a single candidate. For example, 
when third party candidates run, the voting system in the United States can 
result in a candidate being elected with a plurality although most of the 
voters preferred another candidate. This might have occurred if most of 
those who voted for the candidate with the least votes (e.g., Independent 
Ross Perot) preferred a second candidate (e.g., Republican George Bush) 
over the candidate who received the most votes (e.g., Democrat Bill 
Clinton). 
The Australian system avoids the plurality election problem. The 
winning candidate must receive a majority of the preferences of the voters. 
To achieve this when no single candidate has a majority of the first 
preferences, a process of exclusion and recalculation is used. The candidate 
with the fewest first place votes is excluded, and the second place candidate 
on those ballots is treated as the preference of the voter. This process of 
exclusion and ballot recalculation is continued until there are only two 
candidates left or one candidate has a majority.20 
The voting preference system was the focus of Jurgen Henry 
Faderson's challenge to his conviction for failure to vote in a senate election. 
He tried a variant on the statutory route suggested by Justice Higgins in 
Judd. Faderson contended that he had a valid and sufficient reason for not 
voting within the meaning of the statute because he had no preference among 
the candidates. Unlike Judd who opposed voting for any of the candidates, 
Faderson argued that he not only opposed them but also that he could not 
distinguish among them. 
The statutory argument failed in the 1971 case of Faderson v. 
Bridger. 21 The Court denied the premise that the voter could not distinguish 
between candidates. Chief Justice Sir Geoffrey Barwick said, "[t]o face the 
19. Commonwealth Electoral Act§ 240 (1918). 
20. /d. § 274. 
21. 126 C.L.R. 271 (1971). 
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voter with a list of names of persons, none of whom he may like or really 
want to represent him and ask him to indicate a preference among them does 
not present him with a task that he cannot perform. "22 Everyone is different. 
Even a candidate list that consists of Hitler, Jack the Ripper, Pol Pot, and 
Satan can be ranked in order of preference.23 Relying on Judd, and 
particularly relying on Justice Isaacs' opinion in that case, Chief Justice 
Barwick upheld the conviction. If inability to distinguish among the 
candidates were accepted as grounds to refuse to vote, he contended, it 
would undermine the entire compulsory voting system. 
Judd and Faderson made it clear that compulsory voting was 
consistent with the Australian Constitution. But the criminal law only 
required the voter to come to the polling place, take a ballot into the booth, 
and deposit it in the ballot box. "Of course there is no offense committed by 
not marking the ballot paper in such a fashion that the elector's vote is in law 
a valid vote. "24 
The secret ballot enabled the voter opposed to the system to turn in a 
blank ballot without being punished. Indeed, that is just what some 
government critics urged-and that set the stage for the case decided by the 
High Court of Australia this past term. 
C. Ballot Provisions-The Prohibition Against Encouraging Voters to 
Disregard Instructions 
There is no criminal penalty for failing to vote in the manner 
prescribed by Section 240. There couldn't be, because the hallot is secret. 
The primary sanction for failure to follow instructions is that the ballot will 
be invalid or, as it is popularly termed in Australia, "informal." Not every . 
ballot that fails to follow Section 240 is informal. The Electoral Act enables 
election officials to count ballots where a voter neglected to fill in a space or 
mistakenly ranked two candidates alike. Under Section 268(1), a single 
blank space will be deemed the voter's last preference.25 Under Section 
270(2), a ballot will be counted if it identifies a candidate as the first 
preference and has numbers in the squares next to the other candidates or all 
the other candidates but one.26 
22. !d. at 273. 
23. My current preferences, subject to change with further information, are: (1) Jack the 
Ripper, (2) Pol Pot, (3) Hitler, and (4) Satan. 
24. Faderson, 126 C.L.R. at 272. 
25. Commonwealth Electoral Act§ 268(1) (1918). 
26. /d. § 270(2). Under the Commonwealth Electoral Act: 
(2) Where a ballot paper in a House of Representatives election in which 
there are 3 or more candidates: 
(a) has the number 1 in the square opposite to the name of a candidate; 
HeinOnline -- 7 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 116 1996-1997
116 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 7:1 
These provisions enable voters to avoid the expression of any 
preference for secondary candidates by marking a "1" for the candidate of 
choice and "2" for all others, since a repeated number is disregarded. 
Although a ballot which voted for a single candidate would be invalid in an 
election with more than two candidates, a voter can effectively cast a ballot 
for one candidate and ignore all others by giving the others the same 
preference number. 
Thus, the attempt to save the vote of the voter who made a mistake 
created a potential loophole for a single candidate voting procedure. In the 
long run, this could prevent any candidate from getting a majority of the 
preference votes. The Australian Electoral Commission commented on the 
difficulty of retaining the safety valve for people who make a genuine 
mistake while avoiding de facto optional preferential voting. They suggested 
that one method for dealing with this was to penalize individuals who induce 
people to fill out the ballot paper other than in accord with instructions. The 
Commonwealth Parliament responded in 1992 by enacting a new provision, 
Section 329A, which imposed a penalty of six months in prison for its 
violation: 
A person must not, during the relevant period in relation to a 
House of Representatives election under this Act, print, publish 
or distribute, or cause, permit or authorise to be printed, 
published or distributed, any matter or thing with the intention of 
encouraging persons voting at the election to fill in a ballot paper 
otherwise than in accordance with section 240.27 
(b) has other numbers in all the other squares opposite to the names of 
candidates or in all those other squares except one square that is left blank; 
and 
(c) but for this subsection, would be informal by virtue of paragraph 
268(1)(c); 
then: 
(d) the ballot-paper shall not be informal by virtue of that paragraph; 
(e) the number 1 shall be taken to express the voter's first preference; 
(f) where numbers in squares opposite to the names of candidates are in a 
sequence of consecutive numbers commencing with the number 1-the 
voter shall be taken to have expressed a preference by the other number, 
or to have expressed preferences by the other numbers, in that sequence; 
and 
(g) the voter shall not be taken to have expressed any other preference. 
(3) In considering for the purposes of subsection (1) or (2), whether 
numbers are in a sequence of consecutive numbers, any number that is 
repeated shall be disregarded. 
ld. §§ 270(2)-270(3). 
27. Id. § 329A(l). Section 27 of the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act of 1992 
inserted Section 329A in the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1918. 
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D. The Decision of the Australian High Court 
The constitutionality of Section 329A came before the High Court in 
Langer v. Commonwealth. 28 Albert Langer regarded the existing political 
system as fundamentally wrong. He acknowledged that Judd and Faderson 
precluded him from urging voters not to go to the polls. Instead, he urged 
voters to oppose the system by turning in a blank or informal ballot. 
Langer argued that voters must be free to exercise their "choice" for 
members of the House of Representatives under Section 24 of the 
Constitution by turning in blank ballots to show that the voter does not 
choose any of the candidates. Since the voter must be free to fill out the 
ballot in a manner different from the instructions in Section 240, Langer 
argued he should be free to encourage them to do so. Therefore, he 
contended, Section 329A was unconstitutional. 
Langer's basic argument ran contrary to the reasoning of the Court in 
the earlier cases. The High Court had stated in tqose decisions that the 
constitutional requirements of choice were satisfied by alternative candidates 
on the ballot and that voting is a civic duty that can be compelled. All the 
justices in Langer agreed that the mandatory language of Section 240 was 
constitutional. 
Langer stressed the argument on the constitutionality of Section 240 
because his underlying concern was to encourage voters to oppose the 
electoral system, and he realized that he had no chance of persuading the 
Court to strike down a law that forbade encouraging persons to violate 
another valid law. But Section 329A applied even if the defendant had urged 
something lawful. Unlike Section 240, Section 329A punished speech. That 
suggested the possibility that it would violate the implied freedom of political 
communication. The High Court had found Commonwealth laws 
unconstitutional where they prohibited the criticism of government bodies29 
or restricted political advertising.30 The implied freedom even affected 
defamation actions brought by high public officials under the common law 
or state statutes. 31 Thus, while Langer did not press the implied freedom 
argument, it was relevant to his case. 
One Justice thought that the Commonwealth could not constitutionally 
punish persons who encouraged voters to cast valid ballots that did not 
28. 134 A.L.R. 400 (1996). Justice Deane reserved the question of the constitutionality 
of Section 329A for decision by the High Court. Deane was elevated to the position of 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia before the decision in the case. The new 
justice, Michael Kirby, took his seat after argument in Langer's case. Thus, only six judges 
gave their opinions in this case. 
29. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, 108 A.L.R. 681 (1992). 
30. A.C.T.V. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.L.R. 577 (1992). 
31. Theophanous v. Harold & Weekly Times Ltd., 124 A.L.R. I (1994). 
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follow statutory directions. Although Justice Sir Darryl Dawson had 
dissented in the cases which found an implied right of freedom of political 
discussion, he found that Section 329A violated Section 24 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution. He said the provision for members of the 
House of Representatives to be chosen by the people required that voters 
have a genuine choice. "[T]hose eligible to vote must have available to them 
the information necessary to exercise such a choice. "32 
Justice Dawson indicated that government could legitimately punish 
persons who encourage others to cast an informal vote "because the casting 
of a formal, and therefore, effective, vote is in the interests of representative 
government. "33 However, the savings provisions in Sections 268 and 270 
made it possible to cast a valid ballot that does not conform to the directions 
of Section 240. Taken together, these provisions make available optional or 
selective preferential voting as opposed to full preferential voting. 
To prohibit communication of this fact (or at any rate 
communication in the form of encouragement) is to restrict the 
access of voters to information essential to the formation of the 
choice required by s 24 of the Constitution. Thus, s 329A has 
the intended effect of keeping from voters an alternative method 
of casting a formal vote which they are entitled to choose under 
the Act.34 
Justice Dawson concluded that Section 329A was not reasonably and 
appropriately adapted to provide for members directly chosen by the 
people. 35 
It is a law which is designed to keep from voters information 
which is required by them to enable them to exercise an informed 
choice. It can hardly be said that a choice is an informed choice 
if it is made in ignorance of a means of making the choice which 
is available and which a voter, if he or she knows of it, may wish 
to use in order to achieve a particular result. 36 
32. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. 400, 411 (1996) (Dawson, J.). 
33. ld. at 412 (Dawson, J.). In a related case, Dawson voted to sustain a South 
Australian law that prohibited encouraging voters to mark their ballots in state elections other 
than as directed. Muldowney v. South Australia, 70 A.L.J.R. 515 (1996). "Unlike the 
situation in Langer, s 126(1) does not have the aim of discouraging electors from exercising 
an option which is available to them in the casting of a formal vote but is designed to ensure 
that electors are not encouraged to cast an ineffective vote." ld. at 521 (Dawson, J .). 
34. Langer, 134 A.L.R. at 411 (Dawson, J.). 
35. ld. 
36./d. 
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Despite the force of Dawson's arguments, the remaining five justices 
held the law constitutional. According to the majority, the savings 
provisions were designed to minimize the exclusion of ballots, not to provide 
an alternative method of voting. Encouraging people to fill out a ballot in 
a different manner undermined the operation of the preferential system. The 
wisdom and propriety of such a system remain open to full discussion; it is 
the encouragement to act in a way that impairs its desireq operation that the 
statute forbids. 
Chief Justice Sir Gerard Brennan wrote that "the savings provisions do 
not detract from the power to enact s 329A in order to protect what the 
parliament intends to be the primary method of choosing members of the 
House of Representatives. "37 He argued that the savings provisions did not 
prescribe an alternative method of voting but merely saved from invalidity 
some ballot papers which deviated from the prescribed method. "The 
restriction on freedom of speech imposed by s 329A is not imposed with a 
view to repressing freedom of political discussion; it is imposed as an 
incident to the protection of the s 240 method of voting. "38 
Justices John Toohey and Mary Gaudron recognized that the purpose 
of the law appeared to be to limit the possibility of voters deliberately taking 
advantage of the savings provisions so as to express a preference for only 
some of the candidates. This "assists in the maintenance of a system of full 
preferential voting. "39 The law, they concluded, was valid because it 
furthered the democratic process. 
Although the provisos operate to give effect to a ballot paper 
which might otherwise be informal, the democratic process is 
enhanced if a voter's actual intention is capable of ascertainment 
from the ballot paper and effect is given to that intention rather 
than an intention which he or she is deemed to have expressed. 
In relation to ballot papers which fall within the provisos to s 
268(l)(c), s 329A operates to proscribe conduct which might 
encourage voters to fill in their ballot papers in a way that does 
not make their intentions manifest. Because it operates in this 
way, it is reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and 
adapted to the enhancement of the democratic process. 40 
Justice Michael McHugh read Section 240 as giving directions to 
voters on how they are to discharge the statutory duty to vote, but not 
37. ld. at 405 (Brennan, C.J.). 
38. ld. at 406 (Brennan, C.J.). 
39. ld. at 415 (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.). 
40. ld. at 419 (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.). 
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imposing a legal duty on the voter to vote in that manner. Nevertheless, 
failure to follow those directions threatened the preferential system of voting. 
"The system is as effectively undermined by filling in a ballot paper in a way 
that does not indicate the voter's complete order of preferences as it is by a 
vote that is wholly informal. "41 Although there were savings clauses for 
particular ballots, there was only one way to vote according to the 
legislature's direction. Promoting that method did not violate the freedom 
of discussion implied by Section 24 of the Constitution. "There is a world 
of difference between prohibiting advocacy that is put forward with the 
intention of encouraging breaches of statutory directions and prohibiting 
advocacy that criticises or calls for the repeal of such directions. "42 
Finally, Justice William Gummow said that the savings provisions of 
Sections 268 and 270 were ancillary to the primary objective of the 
legislation "and do not evince any legislative intent to make optional or 
selective preferential voting available as an alternative to full preferential 
voting. "43 He found no violation of an implied freedom of discussion 
derived from the system of representative government. "Section 329A does 
not impose any restriction upon political discussion generally nor, more 
particularly, upon discussion as to the suitability or disadvantages in the 
voting system. Rather, it is directed at the particular processes or 
mechanism by which the franchise is exercised and the vote is cast. "44 He 
concluded that the law was valid because the primary objective of the system 
. established by the legislation involved observ'ance of the constitutionally 
proper directions of Section 240. "It cannot be inimical to representative 
government to forbid intentional conduct comprising advocacy of the casting 
of a vote in such a way as may be an ineffective exercise of the franchise. "45 
In summary, a majority of the High Court held that the Commonwealth 
could discourage people from voting in a manner that was lawful but 
undesirable by punishing anyone who encouraged voters to act in that 
manner. The law served the legitimate purpose of supporting the system of 
full preference voting. 
II. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 
Unlike Australia where the protection for speech is implied from the 
political process and limited to speech concerning political matters,46 in the 
41. /d. at 422 (McHugh, J.). 
42. Id. at 423 (McHugh, J.). 
43. /d. at 430 (Gummow, J.). 
44. Id. at 431 (Gummow, J.). 
45. /d. at 431-32 (Gummow, J.). 
46. "[S]peech which is simply aimed at selling goods and services and enhancing profit-
making activities will ordinarily fall outside the area of constitutional protection." 
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United States, the Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment· 
guarantee of freedom of speech applies to commercial speech.47 Only a few 
months after the Australian High Court upheld the prohibition against 
encouraging voters to disregard election voting instructions, the U.S. 
Supreme Court invalidated a state prohibition on advertising liquor prices. 
A. The Problem of Alcohol 
The immoderate consumption of alcohol creates major social 
problems-from drunk driving to domestic abuse to health problems. Taken 
in moderation, however, alcohol may have some benefits. In any event, 
most people want to be able to consume alcohol, and its prohibition creates 
significant social problems. Thus, the Eighteenth Amendrnent,48 which 
prohibited the sale of alc<?hol, was repealed fourteen years later by the 
Twenty First Amendment. 49 
State governments have the power to ban the sale of alcohol or limit 
the amount which may be sold, but the former directly contradicts the desires 
of the political majority, and the latter imposes a costly bureaucratic scheme 
that the average voter would likely fmd intrusive. An alternative method for 
reducing alcohol consumption is to make it expensive-by increasing taxes 
or fixing prices. Higher taxes, however, are usually unpopular, and both 
higher taxes and fixed prices may harm a small state economically by 
diverting purchasers to lower priced liquor stores in neighboring states. 
Rhode Island took a different route. It prohibited the publication or 
broadcast of any advertisements that made reference to the price of any 
alcoholic beverages, including advertisements for stores outside the State. 
The statute declared that the ban was for "the promotion of temperance and 
for the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages. "50 The 
theory was that the advertising ban would reduce price competition and that 
the resulting higher prices for alcohol would reduce the purchases, and thus, 
the consumption. 
Theophanous v. Harold & Weekly Times, 124 A.L.R. 1, 14 (1994) (Mason, C.J., Toohey & 
Gaudron, JJ.). 
47. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1505 (1996). Although the 
Court has found commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, Justice Scalia said he 
followed precedent only because the parties failed to thoroughly brief the underlying issue of 
whether commercial speech is protected. ld. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia 
appears to be the only current Justice who questions the application of the First Amendment 
to commercial speech. 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XVill. 
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
50. R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 3-1-5 {1987). 
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·B. The Legal Background for Regulation of Commercial Speech 
Despite earlier indications that commercial speech (i.e., proposals or 
encouragement to enter a commercial transaction) was not constitutionally 
protected, the Supreme Court held in 1975 that commercial speech was 
entitled to First Amendment protection.~ 1 The following year, in Virginia 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council ,52 the Court struck 
down a ban on advertising the prices for prescription drugs as abridging the 
freedom of speech. The Court developed a framework for analyzing the 
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n of N.Y. 53 In that case, the Court said 
that for commercial speech to come within the First Amendment, "it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. "54 Where the 
commercial speech does come within the First Amendment, the Court must 
determine whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. 55 If so, 
the court "must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest. "56 
· The Court struck a deferential stance toward the decision of the 
legislature to regulate commercial speech in Posadas de P.R. Associates v. 
Tourism Co. of P.R. 51 There the Court upheld a prohibition on a gambling 
room advertising or offering such gambling facilities to the public of Puerto 
Rico. Puerto Rico wanted the revenues from operating casinos for tourists 
but feared the social costs of allowing its own residents to gamble. The 
Supreme Court said that the reduction of demand for casino gambling by the 
residents of Puerto Rico was a substantial state interest which was directly 
advanced by the advertising prohibition and that the legislature of Puerto 
Rico could determine that a restriction on advertising was more effective in 
reducing demand than was the "counterspeech" of anti-gambling 
commercials.58 The Court suggested that the greater power to completely 
ban casino gambling necessarily included the lesser power to ban casino 
advertising: 
It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which 
would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a 
51. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
52. 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
53. 447 u.s. 557 (1980). 
54. ld. at 566. 
55./d. 
56. ld. 
57. 478 u.s. 328 (1986). 
58. !d. at 344. 
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product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to 
forbid the stimulation of demand . . . through advertising on 
behalf of those who would profit from such increas~d demand. 59 
123 
Rhode Island reasoned that this case supported its ban on advertising liquor 
prices. 
C. The Decision of the United States Supreme Court 
Rhode Island statutes prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices, 60 
and the State's implementing regulations, were challenged in a lawsuit 
brought by People's Super Liquor Stores, Inc., a Massachusetts liquor 
retailer which sold to Rhode Island customers, and 44 Liquor Mart, Inc., a 
Rhode Island liquor store. 61 The District Court judge found as a fact that 
"Rhode Island's off-premises liquor price advertising ban has no significant 
impact on levels of alcohol consumption in Rhode Island. "62 He concluded 
that the ban was unconstitutional because the State did not meet its burden 
of demonstrating a reasonable fit between its policy objectives and its chosen 
means.63 The United States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court on 
the grounds that the State could reasonably determine that competitive price 
advertising would lower prices and result in more sales. 64 In 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode lsland,65 the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
decision and unanimously invalidated the Rhode Island statutes. The 
decision was not surprising because the ban reeked of liquor store lobbying 
to secure noncompetitive profit levels rather than concern for the social 
interest in limiting alcohol sales. But the justices went further by effectively 
repudiating Posadas. Yet within this unanimous holding, the opinions were 
fractured. 
In holding the statute unconstitutional, Justice John Paul Stevens said, 
"[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations 
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be 
their own good. "66 Acknowledging the propriety of protecting .consumers 
from deceptive or misleading commercial speech, Justice Stevens 
nevertheless observed that "when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination 
of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the 
59. Id. at 346. 
60. R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 3-8-7, 3-8-8.1 (1987). 
61. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543 (D.R.I. 1993). 
62. Id. at 549. 
63. Id. at 555. 
64. 44 Liquorrnart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1994). 
65. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
66. Id. at 1508 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.). 
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preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart 
from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands. "67 
He said that the State failed to meet its burden to show that the regulation 
would advance its interest in promoting temperance by significantly reducing 
alcohol consumption. 68 Citing alternatives such as higher taxes and direct 
regulation of sales as well as educational campaigns, he added that the State 
could not satisfy the requirement that the restriction on speech be no more 
extensive than necessary. 69 Stevens concluded that the State failed to 
establish a "reasonable fit" between its abridgment of speech and its 
temperance goal "even under the less than strict standard that generally 
applies in commercial speech cases. "70 He then referred to "the more 
stringent constitutional review that Central Hudson itself concluded was 
appropriate for the complete suppression of truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech. "71 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence in which 
she was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices David Souter 
and Steven Breyer. She insisted that the Court should apply the Central 
Hudson test, implying that the reference in Justice Stevens' opinion to "the 
more rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands" was 
inappropriate.72 · She argued that the Rhode Island law failed the fourth 
prong-"that is, its ban is more extensive than necessary to serve the State's 
interest. "73 Justice O'Connor said this element of the Central Hudson test 
required that the law be proportionate: "There must be a fit between the 
legislature's goal and method, 'a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but 
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one 
whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.' "74 
Justice O'Connor's opinion elaborated on the proportionality test used 
for commercial speech. The fit between means and end must be narrowly 
tailored, and the state must reasonably target the scope of the restriction on 
speech to address the harm the state intends to regulate. In its regulation, the 
state must carefully calculate the costs and benefits associated with the 
burden on speech imposed by its prohibition. Less burdensome alternatives 
to reach the stated goal indicate that the fit between means and ends may be 
67. /d. at 1507 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ .). 
68. /d. at 1509 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.). 
69. /d. at 1510 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.). 
70. /d. (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.). 
71. /d. (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.). 
72. /d. at 1521-23 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., 
concurring). 
73. /d. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., 
concurring). 
74. /d. (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring) 
(quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
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too imprecise. On the other hand, if alternative channels permit 
communication of the restrictive speech, the regulation is more likely to be 
considered reasonable.75 
Justice O'Connor saw no reasonable fit between Rhode Island's goal 
of reduced consumption and the method of banning price advertising. The 
Rhode Island law totally barred communication of price information outside 
the store. If Rhode Island wanted to discourage consumption by higher 
prices, higher taxes or minimum prices would more directly accomplish this 
goal without burdening speech.76 
Rhode Island relied on the deference to legislative decisions that the 
Court had shown in Posadas, but both Stevens' and O'Connor's opinions 
repudiated that deference. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Anthony 
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that 
Posadas was wrong: 
The casino advertising ban was designed to keep truthful, 
nonmisleading speech from members of the public for fear thaf 
they would be more likely to gamble if they received it. As a 
result, the advertising ban served to shield the State's 
antigambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct, 
nonspeech regulation would draw .... 
. . . Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was "up to 
the legislature" to choose suppression over a less speech-
restrictive policy. . . . 
Instead, . . . we conclude that a state legislature does not 
have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading 
information for paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority 
was willing to tolerate. 77 
The Court denied that government could ban commercial speech simply 
because government could prohibit the underlying conduct. Where the 
conduct is lawful, truthful, and nonmisleading, speech encouraging that 
conduct is protected by the First Amendment. 
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Souter and Breyer, also repudiated the degree of deference in Posadas. She 
said that the Court had subsequently engaged in more searching examination 
of the fit between means and end: "The closer look that we have required 
since Posadas comports better with the purpose of the analysis set out in 
75. !d. (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
76. !d. at 1521-22. 
77. !d. at 1511 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ.). 
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Central Hudson, by requiring the State to show that the speech restriction 
directly advances its interest and is narrowly tailored. "78 
Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he said 
that the government has no legitimate interest in keeping "users of a product 
or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the 
marketplace. "79 He objected to Stevens' opinion on the grounds that the 
advancement of state interest test suggested that the restriction would have 
been upheld if the State had been more successful in keeping consumers 
ignorant and thus more effective in manipulating their decisions.80 But 
Thomas said that the majority of the justices would effectively reach his 
position as a result of the way in which both the Stevens and the O'Connor 
opinions applied the fourth element of the Central Hudson test-whether the 
restriction of speech is more extensive than necessary to serve the 
government interest: 
The opinions would appear to commit the courts to striking down 
restrictions on speech whenever a direct regulation (i.e., a 
regulation involving no restriction on speech regarding lawful 
activity at all) would be an equally effective method of 
dampening demand by legal users. But it would seem that 
directly banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling 
its price, or otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would 
. virtually always be at least as effective in discouraging 
consumption as merely restricting advertising regarding the 
product would be, and thus virtually all restrictions with such a 
purpose would fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. 81 
The justices seem to have wilfully blinded themselves to the economic 
impact of the alternatives they suggested. Either higher taxes or minimum 
prices could seriously impair the economic viability of Rhode Island liquor 
stores. Residents could easily cross the state lines of the nation's tiniest State 
and buy cheaper booze in Massachusetts at stores like People's. If the state 
cannot consider the undesirable side effects of alternative measures of 
reducing consumption, Thomas might be right in suggesting that the effect 
of this case forbids states from banning truthful nonmisleading speech in an 
attempt to dampen demand for lawful commercial transactions. 
On the other hand, the Rhode Island law left sellers free to advertise 
liquor as insistently and seductively as possible to stoke demand for the 
78. I d. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, II., 
concurring). 
79. ld. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
80. ld. at 1518 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
81. ld. at 1519 (Thomas, 1., concurring). 
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product. Banning price advertisements benefits liquor sellers that charge 
noncompetitive high prices, and this direct effect suggests that enhancing 
these sellers' profits was the law's objective. The existence of alternative 
means to obtain high prices may have been simply makeweights in the 
justices' calculations which helped them to realize that the objective of the 
law was private gain, not public health. 
III. Comparing the Cases 
Despite the differences in result, the courts' analyses exhibit substantial 
similarities. For example, both required a speech restriction to be justified 
by a narrowly tailored law that serves an important government interest. 
The United States Supreme Court, like the Australian High Court, 
apparently permits speech restriction as a way to diminish the incidence of 
a lawful activity encouraged by that speech. The Court in Liquormart did 
not deny the legitimacy of restricting speech to discourage certain lawful 
activities, despite the Court's substantial skepticism about whether the 
restriction was necessary. Justice Thomas concurred separately to disavow 
the other justices' acceptance of Central Hudson's proposition that reducing 
consumption could be an important interest that would justify speech 
restrictions. The state's interest, however, must be in reducing consumption 
and not in affecting views on whether consumption should be reduced. 
Australian courts, like those of the United States, judge the validity of 
the statute in light of the availability of alternatives to achieve the state 
interest without affecting speech. The United States Supreme Court struck 
down the Rhode Island law because the justices found that the State could 
have pursued its legitimate interests with other alternatives. The prohibition 
of liquor price advertising was an unreasonable means of reducing 
overconsumption of alcohol because th~ State could have regulated prices or 
consumption directly. But Langer involved a policy that the state could not 
implement by direct regulation without violating a fundamental premise of 
the political system. The justices in Langer were careful to determine that 
the restriction was "not imposed with a view toward repressing freedom of 
political discussion, "82 that the primary objective was to obtain observance 
of the voting system, 83 and that the law was "reasonably capable of being 
viewed as appropriate and adapted"84 to that purpose. These comments 
suggest that the Australian Court might have viewed the case differently if 
there had existed viable alternatives with which to save the validity of ballots 
filled out negligently while maintaining a full preferential balloting system. 
82. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. 400, 406 (1996) (Brennan, C.J.). 
83. Jd. at 432 (Gummow, J.). 
84. [d. at 419 (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.). 
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The two cases differ on the deference to be shown the legislature. The 
renunciation of Posadas demonstrated that the United States Supreme Court 
would reach its own decision with respect to whether the law was 
appropriate to accomplish a legitimate end. The Australian judges asked 
whether the law was "reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and 
adapted to the enhancement of the democratic process, "85 deferring to the 
legislative judgment that it was so appropriate and adapted. 
But the different standard may be less significant than it appears. 
Given the remoteness of the relationship between high prices aJ?.d 
temperance, a court could determine that the Rhode Island law was not even 
reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and adapted to the 
problem of overconsumption of alcohol. Similarly, even a court applying a 
strict standard might conclude that the Australian law was necessary to 
accomplish its objective, since direct regulation would violate the secret 
ballot. 
The core difference between these cases is their view of the legitimate 
interests for government. The philosophical gap over the nature of 
citizenship is as broad as the Nullarbor Plain and as deep as the Grand 
Canyon. The United States begins with the individual while Australia starts 
with the community. Of course, U.S. citizens have duties toward their 
government Gury service, tax payment, military service, etc.), and 
Australians have individual rights (common law, statutory, and 
constitutional). 86 Nevertheless, the initial premises for government differ in 
each nation. 
The U.S. Constitution bristles with individual rights that reflect a deep 
suspicion of abusive government power. 87 Voting is one of those 
rights-protected against government interference by various Constitutional 
provisions.88 But politics is only one area for individual choice. Freedom 
85. Id. (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.). 
86. E.g., AUSTL. CONST. §§ 41 (right to vote in Commonwealth election of persons 
having right to vote in state elections), 100 (right of state residents to reasonable use of the 
waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation), 117 (right of residents in states not to be 
discriminated against in other states by reason of residence). Several other specific 
prohibitions appear to confer individual rights. E.g., §§ 80 (trial by jury), 92 (trade and 
commerce to be free), and 116 (free exercise of religion). 
87. The word "right," referring to individual rights, is found throughout the document. 
E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, ll, IV, VI, VII, IX, XV, XIX, XXIV, and XXVI. In addition, 
numerous specific limitations on government power effectively confer individual rights. E.g., 
id. art. I,§§ 9, 10; id. art. IV,§ 2; id. amends. I, m, v. vm, XIII, and XIV). 
88. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude[,]" U.S. CONST. amend. XV, or "on account of sex[,]" id. amend. XIX, or "by 
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax[,]" id. amend. XXIV; and "[t]he right of 
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age .... " ld. amend. 
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of speech is important to individual choice in all realms of life-in the market 
and in social relationships as well as in the political realm. 44 Liquormart 
illustrates the broad scope for freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment's guarantee. And choice includes refusal to partake. The 
nation's history demonstrates that the government can operate without 
compelling individuals to participate in the political process, and thus 
compulsory voting could never be an appropriate justification for restrictions 
on speech in the United States. 
In Australia, self-government is not an opportunity but an obligation 
of the citizen. There is freedom to discuss all political ideas, but every 
citizen has an obligation to vote. A government produced by the vote of 
only a fraction of the electorate cannot legitimately be the government of all. 
On the other hand, if every individual participates in the creation of the 
community, the community can be trusted to protect the rights of the 
individual.89 Langer demonstrates the differences between the two nations' 
views of the citizen in the political process. The Australian High Court 
protects choice only as an incident of representative government, so 
obtaining a fully representative government has to be the highest value. 
Protecting a voting system so fundamental to the nation's political theory is 
a compelling justification for government action. 
The American identity was forged in a revolution against the existing 
government. Internal frictions in the United States led to the suppression of 
antislavery speech in the South and brought about a civil war. Fears of 
communism led to a variety of speech-repressive measures after both World 
Wars that subsequently were repudiated to a large extent. Protest 
movements against racial discrimination and the war in Vietnam ultimately 
succeeded, but that success itself suggested that government had not acted 
before in a trustworthy manner. In short, the history and experience of the 
United States has reinforced a deep suspicion of the government. Politicians 
fmd it useful to run against insiders-Presidents Reagan, Carter, and Clinton 
all succeeded in promoting variations on this theme. 
Australia enacted its Constitution through British parliamentary 
processes. It never broke apart in civil war. The national identity of 
Australia was forged in the World War I and II battles against other nations 
rather than in internal revolution. Although Australians differ fiercely over 
a variety of issues and historically had racially oppressive policies on 
immigration and aboriginal rights, Australia does not seem to have developed 
the same degree of fear of government as has the United States. The new 
XXVI. 
89. "Responsible government in a democracy is regarded by us as the ultimate guarantee 
of justice and individual rights." SIR ROBERT MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 54 (1967). 
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free speech protections reflect a recognition of the need to protect freedom 
within the political process, but those protections exist within a community 
united by a very different vision of the citizen's place. 
In the end, it may be possible for Australians and Americans to discuss 
the principles of freedom of speech in a democracy, but, at least for now, the 
two countries begin their discussions from significantly different starting 
positions. It is hoped that, in calling attention to those differences, this 
article will contribute to the dialogue. 
